Except you backed up my argument perfectly. Did you not read the last part about a state actor? This also has nothing to do with something on your personal device. Again, this case is about information stored on someone else's servers.It has been court tested:
Bohannan moves the Court to suppress the fruits of any searches conducted by Microsoft and NCMEC, which includes all evidence of child pornography images obtained in later searches. See Mot. to Suppress at 1, 10-12, 14. Bohannon also moves to suppress the fruits of Servat's visual inspection of the image, and the SFPD's execution of the search warrant.
The Court denies Bohannon's motion. First, the Fourth Amendment does not apply to Microsoft's search, as Microsoft was not acting as a government entity or agent. Even if the Fourth Amendment applied, Bohannon consented to Microsoft's search by agreeing to Microsoft's terms of service.
Second, NCMEC did not conduct any search and thus could not have violated Bohannon's Fourth Amendment rights. Third, when Sergeant Servat confirmed that the image was child pornography, this did not result in any further intrusion on Bohannon's privacy. Finally, the SFPD's warrant was supported by probable cause, and were it not, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would apply because law enforcement reasonably relied on the warrant.
Bohannon argues that Microsoft's initial identification of child pornography in the OneDrive account resulted from an unlawful warrantless search. But the Fourth Amendment does not apply to Microsoft's private actions and, in any event, Bohannon consented to Microsoft searching his account.
The judge could have been wrong obviously, but that seem a common legal opinion:
Courts must exercise caution when admitting evidence into the record obtained through hash value algorithms. It is not, however, per se unconstitutional for private internet service providers to use hash-based examination
Paying close attention to the circumstances surrounding the search, courts must determine the answer to the following questions: (1) Was the individual that conducted the initial search in fact acting as a private individual and not a state actor? (2) Was the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy thwarted by the third-party doctrine? (3) Was there probable cause for the warrantless search? (4) Was the state actor acting within the scope of the private party search? If the answer to any of the preceding questions is no, the defendant should be entitled to suppress the evidence gained during the unconstitutional search. When courts choose to implement this standard analysis, United States citizens receive proper protection both from unreasonable search and seizure by the government, as well as protection from the crime of child exploitation.
Apple is going to be scanning your own device using your own hardware and electricity to intentionally search for something not residing on their hardware and reporting that in order to prosecute someone. Your case does not apply.
Also, if the cloud service becomes mandatory, at that point that case is not likely to apply since it will be impossible to separate from your device and someone else's servers for something that is on your owned device.